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about physics and religion
Willem B. Drees
l Introduction
It has been said that 'scientific realism is a majority opinion whose
advocates are so divided as to appear a minority' (Leplin 1984, p. 1).
Something similar happens in the reflections on physics and theology
in this volume: even though most contributors share a positive attitude
towards religion, they are strongly divided. The discussion is not merely
one about answers, for instance whether or not the Universe had a
beginning, and whether that supports belief in a divine 'first cause'.
The real disagreements concern the questions, the way the problem is
posed. Failures to communicate may have their roots in that which is
considered obvious, and thus often left implicit, rather than in that
which is the explicit topic of the debate. Thus, the aim of this chapter
is to achieve a clearer view of the variety of approaches in relating
physics to religion.
Before embarking on the main topic, I will briefly argue for the rel-
evance of such reflections.
There is a public relations problem for theology in an age of science.
Affiliation with churches is declining. 'Belief in God' is considered by
many to be an option which is superfluous, outdated, falsified, mean-
ingless, or a matter of private taste. The role of science in the rise of
such attitudes should not be overestimated; many other social factors
have also contributed. However, clarifying the relation of religion and
science seems important to the future of religion.
There is also a public relations problem for science. Among those
for whom religion is important, some feel threatened by science. A
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Gallup Poll in November 1991 found that 47 per cent of all Americans
supported a strict creationist view ('God created man pretty much in
his present form at one time within the last 10 000 years'), whereas 40
per cent endorsed a religious view which had adapted to evolution
('Man has developed over millions of years from less advanced forms
of life, but God guided this process, including man's creation'), and
only 9 per cent endorsed a naturalist view ('Man has developed over
millions of years from less advanced forms of life. God had no part in
this process1).1 Defusing feelings of threat, and hence an anti-science
attitude, may well be a relevant PR motive for scientists to participate
in dialogues on science and religion.
Antagonism is one attitude. Unrealistic expectations with respect to
science are another social phenomenon which might be a reason for
concern. For instance, a Natural Law Party participated in British elec-
tions in April 1992. They claim that superstrings and supergravity con-
firm old Vedic insights, as presented in the West by the Maharishi
Mahesh Yogi. Many more examples of misguided spiritual or material
expectations could be listed. Though such expectations may contribute
to a friendly environment for the funding of science, they may do harm
as well, as they may give rise to counter-reactions when expectations
are unfulfilled. Besides, they inhibit the critical role of science through
their quest for an encompassing view.
Even though public relations are important, utilitarian grounds
should not carry the whole weight of the science-and-religion interac-
tion. In my view, three less pragmatic motives are essential as well.
Firstly, there is the need for honesty which presses one to search for
consistency, also in matters of religion. Secondly, curiosity may well
drive one to relate various fairly distinct human enterprises, since new
ideas and insights might come up in an encounter. And, thirdly, con-
cern about the well-being of humans and other living things may be a
reason to reflect upon the impact of science and of religion on our
self-image and on our culture.
The next section will discuss various views of the problem by making
a brief historical tour (2.1) and by arguing that our situation differs
from the mediaeval synthesis of religion and science not merely with
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respect to the content of science, but also in our view of knowledge and
in our appreciation of the world (2.2). These three types of differences
may be related to three views of the 'object' of religion: God, mystery
or meaning. This leads to a variety of interactions with science (3).
Starting from the scientific side, naturalistic and monistic tendencies
related to science provide an important context for reflection on
religion (4). In the concluding section (5), various niches for religion
will be discussed.
2 Various views of the problem
2.1 A brief history of relevance and separation
In the Middle Ages religion and pre-scientific knowledge were inte-
grated. The rise of modern science led to conflicts. This resulted in
modern atheism as well as in religion withdrawing from the cognitive
domain to apparently inaccessible realms such as ethics or feelings.
This story will be sketched and nuanced below. The issue then becomes
in what way religion may regain a place in the cognitive realm, or
whether it should develop more in line with the insights which resulted
in separation.
The medieval synthesis
A synthesis of religious convictions and (pre-) scientific insights seems
to characterize the late Middle Ages. Prominent among the scientific
insights were those of Aristotle, as mediated through Arabic culture. A
major example of a theological system in coherence with the available
knowledge is the work of Thomas Aquinas (thirteenth century). How-
ever, the synthetic approach has not been restricted to systematic
theology. Fiction, like Dante's trilogy about heaven, hell, and purgatory,
illustrates the medieval quest for a world-view as well. Ideas taken
from the Greek philosophers (Plato, Aristotle), from Holy Scripture,
and from the writings of theologians of the first millennium were
integrated.
Among the characteristics of the medieval synthesis were its static
character, its hierarchical structure and its geocentrism. The order,
190
Problems in debates about physics and religion
built upon Aristotle's doctrine of 'natural place' was not merely under-
stood as something factual; the order was also prescriptive (as some
uses of the words 'natural' and 'counter-natural' in our time still
reflect). The order of the world was not something accidental, but
reflected God's order and providence.
Though some elements in the old synthesis were lost with the rise of
modern science, especially its geocentrism (and thus its Aristotelian
doctrine of 'natural place'), at first most scientists argued more or less
in the same way with respect to religion. The order of the world as
science discovered it was the order God had put into it. One could learn
about God from the book of Scripture and from the book of Nature.
It is a misunderstanding that the beginning of modern science was
marked by conflicts between science and religion, or between scientists
and the Church. To make clear that the situation has been more com-
plex, let me make a brief digression on the Galileo affair.
The Galileo affair: relevance or neutrality?*
The conflict that arose in the seventeenth century around Galileo has
often been seen as a conflict between science and the Catholic Church,
or even theology in general. However, the conflict also reflected a clash
between two views of, and social contexts for, science. There was the
scholastic tradition, appealing to previous authorities (Aristotle as
'The Philosopher') and well established in the medieval universities.
The new sciences arose in another setting, in combination with trade
and crafts in the cities which were gaining in importance. Whereas the
then traditional approach equated knowledge and certainty, the new
approach led to modern empirical science, ascribing a more provisional
and probabilistic status to knowledge. The Galileo conflict may be seen
as marked by a specific alliance between the medieval, scholastic tra-
dition in knowledge and certain powerful elements in the Catholic
Church rather than as a straightforward conflict between conservative
religion and progressive science.
The Galileo affair may also be described as a conflict between two
views of religion, especially two views of the relevance of Scripture for
science. In Galileo's writings, for instance his Letter to Grand Duchess
Christina (1615),3 two types of argument about the proper way of
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dealing with the relation between Scripture and natural science can be
found.
(i) Relevance. If science has proven certain facts, one has to adapt one's
interpretation of Scripture. However, if scientific knowledge is merely
'plausible opinion and probable conjecture' in place of sure and dem-
onstrated knowledge, one would have to give priority to Scripture.
'Where human reasoning cannot reach — and where consequently we
can have no science but only opinion and faith - it is necessary in piety
to comply absolutely with the strict sense of Scripture.' Thus, the infor-
mation of Scripture is relevant to our view of the world and vice versa,
but Scripture or science needs re-interpretation if a conflict arises.
Which one needs re-interpretation depends on the certainty of the
claims made by both sides. By the way, science may be open to re-
interpretation in two ways. Either the substance itself may be inter-
preted differently, or the status of scientific statements may be
assessed differently. For example, Copernicus' book De Revolutiombus
Orbium Caelestium (1543) had an anonymous preface (ascribed to
Copernicus but now known to have been written by the Lutheran theo-
logian Osiander) which emphasized that these ideas were no more
than hypotheses, developed for simplifying calculations, and did not
aspire to be true.
(2) Neutrality. Galileo also argues for the neutrality of Scripture in matters
cosmological, and vice versa. He quotes an ecclesiastical authority who
states 'that the intention of the Holy Ghost is to teach us how one goes
to heaven, not how heaven goes'. The Bible is only relevant in matters
'which concern salvation and the establishment of our faith'.
Relevance and neutrality
After the rise of modern science various positions co-existed, of which
some assumed 'relevance', whereas others took off from 'neutrality'.
Some argued for a restricted scope of science and of religion, which
might allow co-existence through mutual neutrality. Others argued that
science and religion cover more or less the same issues (everything?),
which implies relevance of the one for the other, either negatively
(conflict) or positively (harmony).
An antagonistic attitude, maintaining an older view of the world
despite more recent scientific discoveries, is an example of relevance.
Such conflicts continue until our time, 'creationism' being its most well-
known contemporary manifestation. Similar to this rejection of science
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for religious reasons is the rejection of religion as a consequence of
scientific discoveries. Characteristic titles in this context have been
A. D. White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in
Christendom (1896) and J. W. Draper, History of the Conflict between
Religion and Science (1875). However, as a balanced view of history,
this 'warfare' model is far from being the whole story. It too is to be
seen in its social context (e.g. Brooke 1991, pp. 33-42).
Others adapted to new discoveries, arguing for the meaningfulness
of religion in terms offered by the sciences. This may be exemplified
by the English 'arguments from design' tradition. If one were to find
a complex item on the shore, and it turned out that that item could be
interpreted as indicating the time (a watch), one could argue that the
item was designed for that purpose, rather than that the correlation
between the position of the Sun and of the hands on the clock was a
mere coincidence. Similarly, so the argument goes, one should opt for
intentional design of organisms, as their intricacy surpasses the intri-
cacy of watches by far.
Neutrality has expressed itself in emphasizing the differences
between religion and science. The idea that religious convictions are
neutral with respect to scientific ideas has continued to attract major
thinkers over the centuries. One well known example is the philosopher
Immanuel Kant, who discussed in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781)
the status and limitations of theoretical, scientific knowledge, whereas
he introduced religion (God, soul, immortality) in the context of his
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788), his major work on ethics. The
theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (c. 1800) placed the feeling of
absolute dependence at the core of religious life, thus incorporating
the neutrality principle. Feelings or attitudes may also be a meeting
ground for science and faith. For instance, the historian of science Olaf
Pedersen has argued that, 'when a scientist realises the implications
for one's personal existence of the fundamental scientific experience,
he has adopted a relationship towards the world which is essentially
the same as that which the believer adopts when expressing belief
in creation' (Pedersen 1988, p. 138). Science does not disclose God's




A more recent defence of neutrality is provided by the philosopher
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in his later writings emphasized that the
meaning of words is to be understood through their use. Thus, the
meaning of the term 'goal' may be clear in the context of football, but
it is unintelligible in the context of chess. Various practices constitute
various language games. Transferring concepts from one language
game to another language game, say from religion to theoretical
physics or vice versa, is considered a misguided enterprise.
The history of interactions of science and religion does not provide us
with a single coherent view of the nature of the problem. Some suggest
a lack of adaptation of religion to scientific insights (e.g. Wildiers),
whereas others suggest that Christian apologetics went wrong by
adapting too much to the terms of the discussion as set by the natural
sciences (e.g. Buckley, Dillenberger). Historians, and others, describe
the interaction of, or confrontation between, science and religion in
terms which fit their own agenda. That is not merely an agenda with
respect to the relation between science and religion; their own view of
science, religion and human culture is involved. Science-and-religion is
not comparable to building a bridge between two territories which are
sufficiently well-known. Rather, in reflecting on the connection, one
also develops and adapts one's view of the nature of religion and the
scope of science.
Besides, in relation to realism in science as discussed in other essays
in this volume, it may be noted that those who defend religion are not
all on the same side in the realism-empiricism debate. Playing down
the claims and scope of science may be one way to create room for
religion (Buckley, 1987, 1988; see also Feyerabend, Hesse and van
Fraassen in this volume), but scientific and theological realism may also
be aligned (Wildiers, 1982, see also Davies in this volume).
2.2 Three 'variables'
New knowledge separates us from the medieval synthesis. Among the
changes have been the loss of geocentrism, the longer time scales, and
the evolutionary understanding of humanity in relation to the rest of
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the living world. However, there are at least two other types of change
that should be considered as well.
It was not only the knowledge of Nature that changed, but also our
ideas about the nature of knowledge. The subject acquired a more
prominent place. For instance, the philosopher Kant understood as
inaccessible the world as it is in itself; the accessible world is the world
as we describe it in terms of our categories. Although specifying these
categories has turned out not to be a straightforward matter, the
insight still stands that knowledge is shaped by our categories and not
just by the reality it intends to be about. The emphasis on the subject,
with his or her categories of thought, is continued in our century with
the emphasis on the role of language and context and with the decline
of belief in foundations which would provide for certainty. Such issues
are central to other essays in this volume: in what sense is our knowl-
edge knowledge about the world (realism) and to what extent is it our
construction, relevant in a specific practical context but not to be
granted a more universal meaning independent of that context?
A third change regards our appreciation of the world. The mediaeval
synthesis took it that the world reflected a divine order. Some continued
this affirmative line, even if the order of Nature itself was seen differ-
ently. As the poet Pope wrote as the epitaph for Newton's tomb,
'Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night; God said. Let Newton be,
and all was light'. However, others felt that with the loss of the tra-
ditional order of the Universe, all sense of order — whether natural or
social — was crumbling (see, for instance, Toulmin 1990, pp. 62—69).
The changing appreciation of the world is exemplified by the cultural
impact of the earthquake that destroyed Lisbon in 1755. The French
philosopher Voltaire wrote a Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne (1756).
In Voltaire's book Candide ou l'Optimisme (1759) thé philosopher
Pangloss keeps defending the position that this world is the best of all
possible worlds. The more Pangloss argues his case, the less convincing
it becomes. Whereas the mediaeval synthesis affirmed the world as
God's good creation, the present perception allows for meaning-
lessness and ambivalence among the spectrum of valuations of the
world.
Changes in our understanding of religion may be related to all three
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developments mentioned above. Some have attempted to adapt con-
temporary theology to substantial changes in our view of the world.
For instance, creation is no longer understood as a once and for all
event, but rather as a continuous process. Such forms of adaptation to
contemporary insights are to some extent necessary, but they have
their problems. We are evolutionarily adapted to think in terms closely
connected with common sense experience: 'the Sun rises' rather than
'the Earth turns'. Similarly, we are prone to imagining concepts like
'heaven' as 'above', even though it is hard in a time of world-wide
flying to maintain that there is a throne on the clouds. It is not easy to
free ourselves from the categories of thinking which were fruitful in
dealing with the meso-level of reality that was relevant to survival in the
evolutionary development of the human species. Hence, many people
experience changes in our way of conceiving of reality as an unnerving
loss, even though they may agree on the need for new images and
concepts.
Theology has also responded to the emphasis on the human
role in knowledge, for example by withdrawing to 'feeling'
(Schleiermacher), by taking up Kant's transcendental argumentations
about the conditions for the possibility of knowledge or of ethics,
by turning to the subjective and personal (e.g. Martin Buber's 'I-thou'
in contrast with 'I-it'), or by focussing on religious language and
tradition.
Changes in appreciation of the world have affected theology as well.
This is most explicit in those theologians who moved from an under-
standing of God in metaphysical terms, say God as the Ground of
Being, to an understanding of God as being on the side of the victims
or the poor. The 'Death of God' discussion of the 1960s reflects the
stronger emphasis on human autonomy in creating knowledge (the
previous point) and in responsibility, as well as a strong sense of the
reality of horror, of injustice in the world.4
Thus, various authors writing on science-and-religion may easily talk
past each other, even though they seem to address the same issues.
Underlying presuppositions shape the way the dialogue is presented.
We will discuss examples of the contemporary scene in two clusters.
Are physics and theology engaged in a common quest for understand-
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ing? If so, how is the religious 'object' envisaged: as a God beyond
reality, as a mystery at the heart of reality, or as meaningfulness (3)?
And if religion is not understood as knowledge about some ultimate
reality, how is religion to be seen in the context of the evolution of the
human species (4)?
3 Three 'gods' in common cognitive projects
The cognitive relevance of science for religion may be clustered around
three ways of thinking about ultimacy: God, mystery, and meaning,
correlating more or less with the distinctions made above between
changes in our knowledge, in our view of knowledge and in our
appreciation of the world (2.2). How might one think about God in
relation to the Universe (3.1)? Is mystery a persistent ground for
religious wonder (3.2)? Is there ultimate meaning to human existence
in the Universe (3.3)?
3.1 God
Empirical science arose, according to A. N. Whitehead (1926), when
God was conceived of as endowed with 'the personal energy of Jehovah
and with the rationality of a Greek philosopher'. The properties of the
world could not have been deduced by thought alone (the Greek
strand), but neither could they be taken to be purely whimsical, without
regularities, totally dependent upon the mood of some deity. If one
adopts this view of the rise of modern science, science and belief in
God were allies rather than enemies. One could question this view of
the history of science by pointing to other factors, such as the develop-
ment of technology. However, the themes of contingency (3.1.1) and of
rationality (3.1.2) are still central to discussions relating science and
theology. After focussing on these two correlates of divine will and
divine reason, we shall discuss 'design' as a more qualitative notion in
this context, which may be related to specific intentions of the supreme
being, such as its love for humans and its longing for a free response
(3.1.3). In conclusion (3.1.4) various ways of understanding 'God' will
be considered, such as a Platonist view, with emphasis on rationality,
and a deist view, with emphasis on initial contingencies.
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3.1.1 Contingency: room for divine action?
. . . . any contemporary discussion regarding theology and science
should first focus on the question of what modern science, especially
modern physics, can say about the contingency of the Universe as a
whole and of every part in it.
(W. Pannenberg 1988, p. 9)
An event, property, or state of affairs is contingent if it is possible but
not necessary; if it could have been different. The theologians Pannen-
berg and Torrance have correlated the contingency of the world with
divine freedom. God might have chosen differently. God could have
created no world at all, or a world with different ingredients (laws and
initial conditions). In extremis one might hold the view that God would
not be bound in any way; God could have created something logically
contradictory or wicked. Most theologians avoid such consequences by
including goodness and rationality in their concepts of God. If one
includes relationality in one's concept of God, as process theologians
do, God could not lack a creation either. Such a view would have no
need for a contingency of the existence of reality.
Various varieties of contingency might be considered (e.g. Russell
1988). The contingency of existence refers to the question: why is there
anything at all, rather than nothing? Initial contingencies may be pre-
sented in various ways. Why did the Universe start with the properties
it has? Why did the Universe start at that moment (if seen from
eternity), and not, say, infinitely long ago or at some other moment of
time? And could the laws of Nature, or the constants involved in them,
have been different? Aside from questions about the Universe as a
whole, is there some form of 'local' contingency in the processes gov-
erned by the laws? The contribution by John Barrow in this volume
can be read as an analysis of such contingencies in the context of
contemporary physical theories, for example in his discussion of
broken symmetries.
It should be clear that, again, not merely the answers are to be
debated, but the ways in which the questions are posed as well. For
example, one may ask whether the Universe had a beginning a finite
time ago (the Big Bang theory) or not. One may then consider problems
of the kind: 'What was God doing before he created the world?' Rather
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than answering this question, the theologian Augustine of Hippo
(c. 400) replied that the question is wrongly posed, as time is created
together with material reality, rather than being an uncreated universal
background. A similar move has been made in contemporary cos-
mology, when the Newtonian concept of time and space as divine attri-
butes was replaced by the general relativistic understanding of space-
time as a physical entity. This move is even more explicit in quantum
cosmology, where time is not a concept that is universally applicable
(e.g. Isham 1991, 1993; Drees 1991, 1993). Thus, the alternatives are
no longer an infinitely old Universe or a sudden beginning. Rather, it
may be that 'time' loses its status as a universally applicable ontological
notion. Similar shifts may occur for other types of contingency: rather
than answering the question, one might reflect upon the question and
reformulate it in a more appropriate way.
Contingency and necessity seem to me to be relative terms; some-
thing is contingent or necessary in the context of a theory. Science
assumes a principle of sufficient reason, the heuristic principle that one
should always seek reasons. However, this is a methodological prin-
ciple rather than a metaphysical principle, which would claim that
there always must be reasons. Absolute necessity is beyond science.
And absolute contingency is also beyond science. Something which is
contingent in the context of current theories may be shown to be
unavoidable given certain circumstances.
There seems to be an emotional resistance against contingency, as it
seems to make the course of life uncertain, a consequence of random
events rather than of intentional decisions. 'Conspiracy theories' signal
the emotional resistance against interpreting processes as contingent.
If bad luck causes the loss of a dear one, some may attempt, in my
opinion misguidedly, to comfort those that grieve by suggesting that the
loss might be according to a higher plan. Thus, one might be religiously
motivated in opting for a hidden variables view in quantum theory,
according to which all, apparently random, correlations between
events are traced back to a higher coherence.
The discussion about contingency is similar, though more ontological
in language, to the discussion about complete theories and the reach
199
Willem B. Drees
of science (which is more epistemological in language, though not
exclusively so, e.g. Barrow 1988, 1991 and in this volume). It seems
closely connected with ideas about divine creation and interference.
The discussion may focus on global issues, such as 'the beginning'
of the whole of reality. However, it may also be directed towards local
contingency, concerning a part of reality. One might consider quantum
theories and chaos theories as referring to local contingencies in reality.
However, these theories can be interpreted deterministically as well.
For example, Many Worlds Interpretations of quantum theories, which
take it that all possibilities have equal ontological status, imply that
there is no contingency of this kind, though the theory itself may still
be considered contingent.
The interest in 'local' contingencies may be triggered by the quest to
find an acceptable way of thinking about divine action in the world.
Another interest might be to find a place for human free will. However,
'free will' should not be confused with randomness and unpredictability;
it is more like 'self-determination'. Thus, philosophers have also argued
that free will is compatible with full determinism (Dennett 1984). Some
determinism is necessary for a meaningful understanding of free will,
for otherwise it would be impossible to make plans and carry them out.
The reverse side of the emphasis on contingency may be exemplified
through a reference to the polemical book by the British physical chem-
ist Peter W. Atkins, The Creation. As he sees it, science has traced
complex entities back to simpler entities, and these to the vacuum,
which may have arisen by chance. He develops the view that
the only way of explaining creation is to show that the creator had
absolutely no job at all to do, and so might as well not have existed.
We can track down the infinitely lazy creator, the creator totally free of
any labour of creation, by resolving apparent complexities into sim-
plicities, and I hope to find a way of expressing, at the end of the jour-
ney, how a non-existent creator can be allowed to evaporate into
nothing and to disappear from the scene.
(Atkins 1981, p. 17)
Removing contingencies by offering encompassing explanations would
do away with tasks for a deity. One might nonetheless introduce an
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inactive deity, or even a deity which created it all by hand, but that
would be superfluous, against the spirit of science (Occam's razor).
3.1.2 Order and intelligibility: divine rationality?
Whereas emphasis on the role of experiments in science seems to align
with the interest in contingency, one could suggest that the role of
mathematics in science aligns more with stress on rationality. The
mathematical nature of the order of the Universe may suggest religious
themes, especially to theoretical physicists and cosmologists. Sir James
Jeans referred to God as a pure mathematician, and Paul Davies titled
his recent book The Mind of God: The Scientific Basis for a Rational
Universe (1992). And the Polish cosmologist and priest Michal Heller
wrote :
Mathematical structures that reflect the structure of the world are
indeed able to provide a kind of ultimate understanding. In a theologi-
cal perspective the ultimate rationality is that of God. The fact that it is
a mathematical type of rationality is not a new factor in theology. The
metaphor of 'God thinking the Universe' is well rooted in the history
of theology.
(Heller 1990. p. 207)
One might consider the intelligibility of the Universe, our capacity to
grasp the regularities of the Universe, to be the amazing aspect which
invites further reflection of a religious kind. Thus, the Canadian philos-
opher Hugo Meynell argued that the emphasis should be 'on the expla-
nation of the intelligibility of the world, rather than on accounting for
the gaps in that intelligibility' (Meynell 1987, p. 253). It is a kind of
second order argument. Different cosmological programs suggest very
different ontologies, but they have in common that they provide an
intelligible Universe. What is it about the Universe and about us that
makes it possible to think in an orderly way about it; in other words,
makes it possible to frame adequate mathematical theories? Meynell
defends the view that 'there is something analogous to human intelli-
gence in the constitution of the world' (1982, p. 68). Paul Davies
addresses similar questions in his recent book (Davies 1992) and in his
contribution to this volume. He holds the view that the capacity to do




opportunity to suggest some of the problems that the position of Davies
might have to face.
ID Is it true that the world is intelligible? Who understands quantum
theory? Many are able to work with the formalism, but 'understand-
ing' is an ambiguous term, as the following anecdote from an Oxford
exam of about a century ago, quoted by Barrow (1988, p. 193),
illustrates.
Examiner: What is Electricity?
Candidate: Oh, Sir, I'm sure I have learn't what it is — I'm sure 1 did
know — but I've forgotten.
Examiner: How very unfortunate. Only two persons have ever
known what electricity is, the Author of Nature and yourself. Now
one of them has forgotten.
Almost everybody knows that the light switch affects the light. Many
believe they understand it. But those that continue questioning may
well raise difficulties. Electricity is manipulable and well describable by
Maxwell's laws. However, is manipulation and calculation the whole of
understanding?
(2) The fact that mathematics is so effective in theoretical physics may be
like the amazing fluency of natives in their own language. Physicists
have been trained in using mathematics, so why should one be sur-
prised if they use it and find it effective for the problems they deal
with? It might well be a property of their approach or of the problems
they select. However, such a rebuttal seems too easy. Mathematical sci-
ence has an effectivity which is also recognized by those not trained in
mathematics.
(3) An evolutionary explanation assumes that the capacity for knowing
may have been advantageous to those who had it. It seems obviously
advantageous to be able to anticipate the trajectory of a moving object,
say a falling apple, a stone or a spear. However, what could have been
the advantage for early hominids of being able to work out explicitly a
mathematical theory of these phenomena? We seem to have been
served more than we ordered. The ability to do abstract mathematics
seems evolutionarily inexplicable — a product of design rather than of
evolution?
The case for an evolutionary explanation might be defended by con-
sidering the similar problem for reading and writing. Whereas the
ability to use speech seems to have co-evolved with certain structures in
the brain, this cannot have been the case for reading and writing,
which are fairly recent cultural innovations, In this case it seems likely
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that certain already existing structures in the brain were used for the
new purposes of reading and writing, perhaps structures that pre-
viously served in interpreting tracks of animals (and were therefore
evolutionarily selected). An inexplicable preadaptation of the brain to
reading is an unnecessary assumption. Rather, the evolutionarily explic-
able plasticity'of the brain allowed for these new forms of behaviour.
Similarly, we may be able to use the ten fingers to play the piano,
although they evolved due to other evolutionary pressures. And simi-
larly, one might argue, there could be a potential for abstract math-
ematical reasoning, though the corresponding brain structures were
developed for other purposes due to other evolutionary pressures.
(4) The apparent intelligibility and lawfulness of the Universe may also be
a consequence of selective observation. One could imagine a chaotic
Universe, with some temporal eddies of regularity and intelligibility.
Complex organisms, such as human beings, might exist only in such
eddies, and hence observe regularity and infer intelligibility. An anal-
ogy may be taken from economics. One might think that intelligible
economic development correlates with a strong central planning
agency. However, a free market economy may, in principle, also lead
to an overall intelligible development even though there is no overall
planning. One could interpret this by formulating 'freedom' as the
overall principle, but one could also say that there is no principle. This
is the line of thought behind J. A. Wheeler's quest for 'law without
law'. The trend in theoretical physics may be towards complete intelligi-
bility, a unified Theory of Everything. 'But it may be that our undoing
of the catalogue of Nature's laws will take us down a different road,
which will lead us to the recognition that there is no such ultimate
Theory of Everything: no law at all' (Barrow 1988, p. 297).
3.1.3 Design and the anthropic coincidences
Even if contingency, intelligibility or unity would allow an interpret-
ation in relation to God as creator, they seem to lack specific intention.
The specific order of the Universe might, however, be interpreted the-
istically as evidence that God is not interested in creating any odd
universe, but a universe in which beings of a certain kind can exist.
The most recent variant of such thinking has been debated in
relation to the anthropic principles (e.g. Barrow and Tipler 1986,
Davies 1982, Drees 1990, pp. 78-89; see also Barrow and 't Hooft in
this volume). The Universe has certain properties, for example three
spatial dimensions, a certain size and age, a specific strength of the
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gravitational force compared with the electromagnetic force. One
might consider other universes with other properties. It turns out that
most of such imagined universes would not allow for the evolution of
complex organisms based on carbon chemistry. Thus, we seem to be
extremely lucky that the Universe actually has the properties it has.
The discussion needs some distinctions. First, one should distinguish
between the anthropic coincidences, as I prefer to name correlations
between properties of the Universe and our existence, and the
anthropic principles, which may be seen as various attempts to inter-
pret the coincidences. Among these are the Weak Anthropic Principle,
which points out that what we see is biased in favour of those parts of
the Universe where we can exist, thus emphasizing that the coinci-
dences may have to do with selective observation. There are also Strong
Anthropic Principles, which suggest that these properties are in some
sense necessary for any possible universe, whether observable or not.
Within this latter category one might consider as a specific case a
Theistic Anthropic Principle: these properties are a consequence of
design. An attractive feature of the design argument is that it suggests
something about God's intentions, of which humans are a part. Per-
haps God created our kind of world because God wanted a world in
which living, conscious and sentient beings could live and relate to God
in a freely loving way. Freedom of response might have been such a
highly valued good for the creator, that the creator was willing to sacri-
fice full control of the processes. Along such lines some have suggested
that belief in a powerful and loving God might be compatible with the
evil and suffering present in the world (a free will and free process
defence).
I have doubts regarding the anthropic arguments and their religious
use, which I will present below.
The Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP) states that what we see must be
compatible with our existence. We see a Universe with planets, as our
existence depends on planets. We see a Universe which existed for
billions of years, because it took billions of years to develop beings
which are capable of thinking about the age of the Universe. The WAP
has the nature of a selection rule : our observations are biased in favour
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of situations where we can exist. It is as if we attempt to find out how
often railway crossings are closed. If we observe them only from trains,
we will find that crossings are always closed. In cosmology, we can
observe the Universe only from a spatially and temporally very restric-
ted set of points of view. Thus seen, the WAP has no metaphysical
significance but is a reminder of the biased nature of our observations.
I think that the WAP is correct but devoid of relevance. If we know
that life depends on liquid water and we observe the existence of life,
we may conclude that our environment must contain water, and thus
must have a temperature within a specific range. This is the common
use of evidence : we observe life and conclude that something else which
goes together with life is also the case. This does not explain either our
existence or the existence of water. The explanation of an event or of
certain conditions is in general something different from the expla-
nation one offers when asked 'How do you know?' From the existence
of this chapter you may infer the existence of its author, but the paper
does not explain my existence. Retrograde reasoning justifies beliefs,
but it does not explain why the situation was the way it was.
The WAP might be combined with the idea that all possible worlds
are actual. The latter has been defended, for example in analogy with
a Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum theory or in the context of
specific cosmological theories which allow for many different regions
(larger than our observable universe) with different properties. The
existence of our Universe with its anthropic coincidences is then
explained on the basis of the assumed actuality of all possibilities. The
explanation is not so much due to the principle of selective observation
(WAP), but to the metaphysical view that all possibilities are actual
(plenitude), which 'explains' the existence of quite a lot.
The Strong Anthropic Principle (SAP) has been stated thus: 'The Uni-
verse must have those properties which allow life to develop within it
at some stage in its history' (Barrow and Tipler 1986, p. 21). This is
not a statement about what we actually observe, but about the class of
possible universes. It leads to an explanation of properties of the Uni-
verse in terms of purpose : a property that is necessary for life is neces-
sary for the Universe. Such ideological explanations have a long his-
205
Willem B. Drees
tory, but they are not widely accepted in contemporary science. SAP
arguments have some disadvantages. (1) Properties of other possible
universes are unobservable and untestable. Thus, strong anthropic
reasoning cannot rely on testable consequences about the class of poss-
ible universes, but must base its appeal on the coherence of the view
which it supports. (2) Is it helpful to explain the properties of the Uni-
verse by reference to life or consciousness, which in all its richness (and
possible other forms) is not fully understood? (3) SAP explanations are
vulnerable to future developments. Successive theories have, generally
speaking, fewer and fewer parameters. If that trend continued, the set
of possible universes (without invoking SAP reasoning) might be very
small, perhaps even containing only one possible universe, ours.
If applied at a smaller scale, as in 'planets must have the properties
which allow for the development of life in some stage of their history',
a Strong Anthropic Principle is surely false. However, the example
shows the ideological nature of SAP: everything must have a purpose.
Hence, the Moon must be populated, as the ancient philosopher
Plutarch argued.
A Theistic Anthropic Principle? John Polkinghorne, a professor of
theoretical physics who became an Anglican priest, calls the ideas
about other worlds 'metaphysical speculation'. 'A possible explanation
of equal intellectual respectability — and to my mind greater economy
and elegance - would be that this one world is the way it is because it
is the creation of the will of a Creator who purposes that it should be
so' (Polkinghorne 1986, p. 80).
Such an apologetic strategy does not work. (1) The argument
assumes that the anthropic coincidences are here to stay. However,
some (or even all) of these features, which apparently point to design,
might find more traditional scientific explanations in future theories.
That has happened for the traditional design arguments based on
intracosmic adaptedness. The inflationary scenario in cosmology has
already led to some erosion of anthropic coincidences. (2) The idea
that the assumption of a single creator is more economical than the
argument of a plurality of worlds (with WAP selection) is a misapplica-
tion of the "economy' rule (Occam's razor). It is simpler to accept a
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theory, say about the formation of planetary systems, in its predictions
beyond the observable domain, than to draw a line between what is
currently observable and the rest. The issue of simplicity and economy
is not so much one about the number of entities predicted by a theory
but one about the structure of the theory. Some cosmological theories
are more simple if one allows for the existence of many worlds than if
these were to be excluded. (3) The argument for design assumes that
certain features of the Universe are improbable if not for design. How-
ever, the probability or improbability depends on the features con-
sidered and on the class of alternative universes considered. The basis
of the argument is not as objective as it seems, as has been pointed
out by Ovenden (1987, pp. 105f.).
3.1.4 What kind of God?
'The most miraculous thing is happening. The physicists are getting
down to the nitty-gritty, they've really just about pared things down to
the ultimate details, and the last thing they ever expected to happen is
happening. God is showing through.'
'Mr Kohler. What kind of God is showing through, exactly?'
{Dialogue between a computer freak and a professor at a divinity
school, in Roger's Version by John Updike (New York 1989. p. 9)
As in the quoted dialogue, it is relevant to ask 'what kind of God' is
appearing in the context of such cognitive dialogues between science
and religion.
'God' may be thought of as the cosmic watchmaker, the engineer who
constructed the initial state and lit the fuse. Carl Sagan wrote in his
preface to Stephen Hawking's A Brief History of Time that the conse-
quence of Hawking's theory is that there is no absolute beginning of
reality, and therefore no need for a creator (Sagan 1988, p. x). A simi-
lar deist notion of God seems the aim of arguments that purport to
show that there was an absolute beginning, inexplicable within the
Universe, and hence a cause beyond the Universe.
When Hawking concluded his book by linking knowledge of the
ultimate theory to knowledge of 'the mind of God', he used a more
Platonist image of God. Other examples of this kind of thinking
among theoretical physicists are Roger Penrose's defence, in his The
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Emperor's New Mind, of the reality of a timeless realm of mathematical
truths, and Paul Davies' discussion, in his The Mind of God, of the
relation between mathematics and reality (see also the essays by
't Hooft and Davies in this volume).
A theist view has God both as the highest (transcendent, timeless)
being, a Platonist element, and as the original creator, a deist element.
Besides, God is understood to be active in time, either in human history
or in the whole course of evolution (creatio continua). This position is
not an easy one to maintain, since these aspects of God are hard to
combine with each other.
An alternative may be a pantheist view, which assumes an ontologi-
cal identity of God and world, rather than the more dualist conceptions
mentioned before. We will return to such views in the next section, on
mystery.
32 Mystery: a common awareness of not-knowing?
Robert Jastrow concluded his God and the Astronomers with the fol-
lowing image.
For the scientist who has lived by his faith in the power of reason, the
story ends like a bad dream. He has scaled the mountains of ignor-
ance: he is about to conquer the highest peak; as he pulls himself over
the final rock, he is greeted by a band of theologians who have been
sitting there for centuries.
Oastrow 1980. p 125)
The essence of modern cosmology is, according to Jastrow, that the
Universe 'began at a certain moment of time, and under circumstances
that seem to make it impossible — not just now, but ever — to find out
what force or forces brought the world into being at that moment'
(1980, p. 12). Theology always lived with the awareness of its inability
to express what God is. This section will not deal with the cosmological
issue; Jastrow's specific example is in need of modification due to the
development of quantum cosmology (Isham 1991,1993). The issue here
is the emphasis on the limits of human knowledge. Is there a common
meeting ground for religion and science in not-knowing?
One of the Ten Commandments in the Jewish and Christian heritage
is the prohibition against worshipping idols, a practice which is con-
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sidered religiously and socially destructive. The Greek heritage devel-
oped a more metaphysical and epistemological critique of anthropo-
morphic concepts of God. As the origin of knowledge and existence
God is beyond knowledge. Later systematic thought in Christianity dis-
tinguished between two ways of thinking about God's attributes. The
first way is one of extrapolation and affirmation. We know to a certain
extent what 'power', 'presence', and 'wisdom' mean. God is then
thought of as omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient. The other
approach is labelled the via negativo: we deny features of reality in
reflecting upon God. Stating that God is atemporal is not a positive
statement about God's nature, but a denial of temporality. 'God is infi-
nite' is not a cognitive statement, as if one claimed to know what 'infi-
nite' meant, but a denial of creaturely fmitude. We should respect the
'is not' character of metaphors, especially in religion, as they save us
from absolutizing images and falling into idolatry (McFague 1982).
That would result in a loss of sensitivity for the symbolic nature of
religious language. Thus, recognition of God as the unknowable, as a
mystery at the heart of religion, seems well rooted in religious thought.
Are there any reasons within science to assume that there is a mystery
about which we cannot speak scientifically? In his Cosmic Understand-
ing (1986) Milton K. Munitz gave a philosophical analysis of scientific
cosmology. The Universe as it is known, as an intelligible unit, is a
product which results from the application of a conceptual scheme.
This should not be misunderstood, as if reality owes its existence to
concepts. It is an epistemological point: all theories about the Universe
are constructs which use human concepts. Conceptual boundedness is
inescapable if one wants to achieve intelligibility. One aims at tran-
scending the conceptual limitations of a theory by entering another
conceptual scheme, which has its own boundaries. A similar point has
been made by Harrison in his Masks of the Universe (1985). Each
understanding of the Universe is a mask which is held in front of the
real, but in itself unknowable, Universe.
One could stop here. Is there 'a dimension of reality "beyond" any
account of the known Universe (or any of its contents), of which we
can have a mode of awareness that is not hemmed in by the constraints
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and ever-present horizons of cosmological knowledge?' (Munitz 1986,
p. 229). The epistemological endlessness of the cosmological search
might be due to such an ontological 'ultimate boundlessness or inde-
terminability at the very heart of reality' (Munitz 1986 p. 229). This
reality would not be conceptually bounded the way the Universe is, nor
would it be bound by anything beyond itself. 'Boundless Existence' is
not the name of an object or entity.
We shall be driven, consequently, and at the end, to silence, although
the 'talk' on the way, if at all helpful, will have its value in making the
silence a more pregnant one, and indeed the occasion for having an
overridingly important type of human experience.
(Munitz 1986, p. 231)
Munitz attempts to point to something which epistemologically tran-
scends all our knowledge — something which is, however, at the heart
of reality, hence ontologically immanent.
In the context of quantum physics, Bernard d'Espagnat has argued
that 'we have to reckon with two realities. More precisely, present-
day physics calls for a clear-cut distinction between two notions both
designated in the past by the word 'reality', independent reality
which is distant, 'veiled', and empirical reality, the totality of phenom-
ena (d'Espagnat 1989, p. 7). It is this latter reality that we understand
better with each day that passes. Positivist thinkers, both from
philosophy and in the Copenhagen tradition of quantum physics,
have attempted to rule out independent reality as meaningless.
Materialists and realists tend to subsume the notion of empirical
reality under that of independent reality. However, 'in our time
science itself has provided us with pressing reasons for accepting
the (philosophical) duality of Being and of phenomena' (d'Espagnat
1989, p. 7). These reasons are taken from quantum physics, which
is not merely about the nature of reality, but about the possibilities
of knowing about reality.
Does science suggest the existence of an unknowable or veiled reality?
This question is strongly linked with discussions regarding scientific
realism with which various chapters in this volume deal. Besides, one
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should not merely consider what we do not know (which might be
knowable or unknowable), but also what we know negatively. Ideas
previously held to be true, or probable, have been shown to be wrong,
or at least probably wrong. Science may not be able to provide a grand
view of reality, including the mysterious, but scientific research may
serve well to criticize ideas about that reality. This could be liberating,
as it creates room for new ideas.
If the 'veiled reality' (d'Espagnat) or 'boundless existence' (Munitz) is
taken seriously, one still may wonder what its significance for religion
can be. Is it merely an expression of our cognitive limitations, and the
recognition of unknowable or partly knowable aspects of reality? Is that
sufficient to inspire religious awe? Or does religious mystery presuppose
certain qualities about that mysterious reality, which might justify associ-
ations with love, trust or beauty? It is not clear to me how such a transition
of categories is to be made in the context of these approaches.
Besides, there may well be a strong hesitancy in theological circles
to make too much out of these apparent mysterious aspects. The metho-
dological catch word is the 'God-of-the-gaps'. It has happened that
gaps in a scientific account, e.g. an account of the evolution of the
human out of earlier mammals, or of complex physical phenomena,
were seen as possible loci of special divine intervention. Such an
approach disregards the coherence of the scientific account, and may
result in a religious position which is always on the retreat as science
successively fills such gaps. Are there gaps which do not erode? Are
these mysteries of Munitz and d'Espagnat persistent? Or will there be
a future theory beyond quantum physics which lends itself much better
to an interpretation of reality in a single scheme of objective reality,
without the distinction between veiled and empirical reality? One might
connect this with the earlier discussion about contingency: is there any
contingency that will be inaccessible to science? Are the laws of nature
possible candidates, or might they be necessary? And what about the
existence of something rather than nothing?
3.3 Meaning: human existence in the Universe
Neither 'God' nor 'mystery' is the concept central to contemporary
religious thought. 'Meaning' seems to have become a replacement
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which is more acceptable to many in contemporary secular Western
culture because it is less suggestive of anything supernatural.
Order out of Chaos (1984) by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers
has as its title in the original French edition La Nouvelle Alliance:
Métamorphose de la Science (1979). The claim is that there is a new
alliance between humans and Nature, due to changes in science. The
classical (Newtonian) physical sciences used to think of reality in a
way in which human existence was itself a marginal side product
of the evolutionary process of mutation and selection. But develop-
ments in science are believed to have paved the way for a new view
of the place of humanity in natural reality. Unlike the covenant of
Moses at Mount Sinai, this one is an alliance between humanity and
physical reality. Humans are no longer strangers in a mechanistic
world. The central tenet of Prigogine and Stengers is that 'science
is rediscovering time' (1984, p. xxix). Their case is based upon the
development of thermodynamics for systems which are far from
equilibrium, which, under the right circumstances, develop into new
ordered states.
When Nobel Prize winner Prigogine and his co-author Stengers
claimed a 'new covenant', they were responding to Nobel Prize winner
Jacques Monod whose influential book Chance and Necessity ended
with the following sobering (or liberating?) thought:
The ancient covenant is in pieces; man at last knows that he is alone
in the unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which he emerged
only by chance. Neither his destiny nor his duty have been written
down. The kingdom above or the darkness below: it is for him to
choose.
The kingdom above is the kingdom of knowledge, 'within man, where
progressively freed both from material constraints and from the mis-
leading servitudes of animism, man could at least live authentically'
(Monod 1971, p. 167). The 'darkness below' is the variety of animisms,
including Utopian ideologies such as historical materialism. The ethics
of knowledge is based on an ethical choice, an axiom which humans
impose on themselves. It 'thereby differs from animist ethics, which all
claim to be based on the "knowledge" of immanent, religious or "natu-
ral" laws which are supposed to impose themselves on man' (Monod
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1971, p. 164). Animisms fail to make the proper distinction between
judgements of value and those of knowledge.
It is perfectly true that science attacks values. Not directly, since science
is no judge of them and must ignore them; but it subverts every one of
the mythical or philosophical ontogenies upon which the animist tra-
dition, from the Australian aborigines to the dialectical materialists,
has based morality: values, duties, prohibitions.
If he accepts this message in its full significance, man must at last
wake out of his millenary dream and discover his total solitude, his fun-
damental isolation. He must realize that, like a gypsy, he lives on the
boundary of an alien world ; a world which is deaf to his music, and as
indifferent to his hopes as it is to his suffering or his crimes.
(Monod 1971, p. 160)
Whereas Prigogine and Stengers may be seen to argue for close ties
between humanity and the cosmic processes, Monod describes humanity
as a cosmic oddity, arisen by accident. Meaning is not found in that pro-
cess, which is described by science, but rather in a more existentialist
mood in the human choice for objectivity. Objectivity as the ethical axiom
cannot itself be based upon some scientific objective basis. It is this ethical
axiom which bars science from becoming a basis for further values.
The merits of various proposals about science and meaning, also in
the context of other sciences, deserve, of course, more detailed dis-
cussion than can be given here. I want to conclude by suggesting a
position which is intermediate between meaninglessness and meaning-
fulness. The astronomer Hubert Reeves refers to the myth of Prome-
theus when he discusses the development of nuclear weapons. An
unprecedented capability for destruction is based on an impressive
amount of knowledge. We are placed in a border zone, between good
and evil. The development of complexity, life, consciousness and intelli-
gence in the course of cosmic evolution is ambivalent. Meaning is some-
thing we may create, rather than detect.
4 Naturalist challenges for religion
So far we have concentrated on different views of the 'object of
religion', God, mystery and meaning, correlating these with changes
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in knowledge, views of knowledge, and in appreciation of the Universe.
Now we will take our starting point from the scientific side. It will be
argued that science poses serious challenges to religion; not just to
religion which takes science to be relevant, but also to religion which
seeks mutual neutrality through separation (see above, 2.1). We will
say a few words about the nature of science, before turning to scientific
approaches to religion.
4.1 The nature of science
Mountain peaks do not float unsupported; they do not even just rest
upon the earth. They are the earth in one of its manifest operations.
{John Dewey. Art as Experience, 1934, p. 3)
The motto of this section intends to capture an outlook which is shared
by most people involved in science. Mountain peaks do not float unsup-
ported, nor do they rest upon the Earth. Rather, they are manifestations
of the Earth. Similarly, expected and unexpected phenomena are
assumed to be part of the same physical reality. When superconductivity
at higher temperatures was discovered, no one doubted that that
phenomenon would be, if confirmed, a manifestation of the possibilities
of matter, even if it was not yet understood how it fitted into existing the-
ories. Such an assumption, taking all phenomena to be manifestations of
a single reality guided by the same basic laws, correlates with the metho-
dological rule that one should search for naturalist explanations similar
to those that were adequate for simpler phenomena. Thus, explanation
of biological phenomena in chemical terms will be attempted, even
though some biological concepts go beyond the vocabulary of chemistry.
Ontological monism without reductionism of all sciences to physics is one
of the contemporary positions presented by Dieks in his essay in this
volume. Even if one agrees that complete reduction to physics is imposs-
ible, the attempt may be heuristically useful. Since the basic rules of phys-
ics and chemistry do without 'purpose' or 'goal directedness', one is led
to the idea that biological evolution should be explained without refer-
ence to an overall purpose, even though individual organisms do have
purposes, if described at a level which allows for such a concept.
In this context, two methodological rules are often invoked, though
it is difficult to express them both in a precise form and with general
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applicability. The first rule, 'Occam's razor', named after the four-
teenth-century theologian William of Occam, demands that one should
not introduce additional entities or principles without good reason.
What counts as good reason needs, of course, further discussion in any
specific situation. Using this rule, adding a religious explanation when
one could do without one, is against the spirit of science.
The other methodological rule, requiring the avoidance of ad hoc
assumptions, works against religious superstructures as well. This can
be illustrated by the way P. H. Gosse harmonized Darwinian evolution
with his belief in a fairly recent creation of all species. In his book
Omphalos (navel) (1857) he argued that God had created Adam with
a navel, suggesting a mother where there had been none. The trees in
the Garden of Eden had been created with a complete set of annual
rings, suggesting growing seasons though there had been none. The
fossils suggest an evolutionary history, but one can not refute the pos-
sibility that God created them in the appropriate strata. This view is
logically consistent, but contrived, ad hoc. All extragalactic and most
intragalactic astronomy as well as palaeontology would become a study
of God's magic rather than a study of stars, galaxies, and of species
that once lived on Earth. It may be hard to specify precisely when a
move is to be considered ad hoc, but that does not take away the
intuition that certain moves are to be avoided.
We will now turn to the understanding of the phenomenon
'religion' under the monist assumption. However, it should be noted
that not all working scientists nor all philosophers agree on the
assumed ontological monism (see, for instance, Feyerabend, Chapter
6, in this volume).
4.2 Naturalist views of religion
Reflections on God, meaning and mystery assume that religion embodies
significant cognitive insights. Some serious thinkers, both scientists and
theologians, see religion not as a metaphysical supplement to scientific
explanations, but as dealing with other aspects of human existence. As
will be argued here, such a view of religion does not imply that there is
no need for a dialogue with the natural sciences. Religion may be far
removed from physics, but an existentialist, ethical, or anthropological
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view of religion gets one into a discussion with naturalist approaches in
biology and, beyond biology, in the human sciences.
Humans, with their epistemological capacities and their habit of
making moral judgements, evolved from other hominids in correlation
with the evolution of culture, e.g. the use of language and the ability
to perceive and communicate various states of affairs. According to
Alexander (1987), mechanisms of indirect reciprocity and social status
within a group and the need for coherence, and mutual support in the
competition with other groups of hominids, may have been important
evolutionary pressures in favour of morality. The advantage of deceiv-
ing others, and the advantage of recognizing attempts at deception,
may have been important factors in the evolution of the unconscious
and of consciousness.
One might adopt a similar diachronic and functional approach to
the origin of religion. Maybe religions arose in the evolutionary history
of the human species as an essential ingredient for the emergence of
distinctive characteristics of the human species, for instance by making
possible large communities, inexplicable by relations of kinship alone.
Burhoe (1981) argues for a co-evolution of human genetic and cultural
information, with religion (ritual, narratives and more systematic sys-
tems of thought) imprinting cultural values into the human brain. As
he sees it, religions have been essential to the evolution of the brain.
Ritschl (1984, p. 34) discusses religion in the context of cultural press-
ures in a far more recent phase, as a way of dealing with stress when
hunter-gatherers became sedentary. Whereas Burhoe, a Unitarian of
Calvinist background, interprets evolutionary history in the context of
an understanding of God as sovereign, powerful and selective, the
Lutheran Theissen (1984) puts emphasis on tolerance for variation and
grace <cf. Drees 1991a, pp. 92-100). Theissen seeks through a func-
tional approach an ontological perspective on God or 'ultimate reality',
understanding it as the realm to which successive adaptations adapt.
Even if religion (ritual, myth and systematic reflection) arose as a con-
sequence of certain evolutionary pressures, that does not exclude the
possibility that there is a genuine transcendent referent of religious
worship. However, in adding such a transcendent referent one is in
danger of violating Occam's razor.
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Besides the evolutionary perspective, one might also consider genetics,
neurophysiology and other biochemical approaches to human nature. Is
it possible to discuss human religion and morality independently of stud-
ies of such underlying structures? Reflections on genes and identity may
well bear upon religiously relevant notions such as soul and body, spirit
and flesh, self, immortality and resurrection, death, mystery (as the
wisdom encoded in our genetic heritage is only secondarily accessible in
language; Eaves 1991, p. 499), sin and grace (Eaves and Gross 1990).
Whether there is a role for physics apart from biology, is not easy
to judge. The theologian Pannenberg (1985; see for a criticism Eaves
1989) prefers to stick to the work on open systems of Prigogine and
others when discussing the phenomenon of life, whereas he turns to
anthropologies of a philosophical nature when discussing the distinc-
tively human, thus avoiding a confrontation with sociobiology and gen-
etics. John Polkinghorne (1991) sees chaos theories as a first approxi-
mation to a physical theory which allows for human freedom and for
divine action in the world. Appealing to contemporary physics in argu-
ments regarding determinism, free will and self-determination is not
easy (e.g. Earman 1986). Some problems arise due to the implicit leap
from physical discourse to the discourse of the humanities. The inter-
mediate levels of biological reality enrich the conceptuality, both with
respect to persons and environments, in such a way that the discussion
changes. On the one hand, using physics to avoid confrontation with
geneticists and sociobiologists seems an unwarranted eclectic
approach. On the other hand, is it possible to defend the concept of a
free will without allowing for various possible outcomes, and hence
without having an ontology which allows for various possibilities in
connection with actuality? Or is a fully determinist view, without local
contingencies, acceptable even if one wants to maintain notions like
free will and responsibility, as Dennett (1984) defends?
As this section illustrates, even if one separates religion and science by
emphasizing that religion has to do with personal aspects whereas
science deals with non-personal aspects, one might need to reflect on
science, especially where it deals with our view of human nature, includ-
ing its social and emotional aspects.
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5 Niches for religion
Various options for religion in relation to the natural sciences are avail-
able. One option might be to dismiss the scientific results. Such an
approach, as has arisen in relation to evolutionary biology, seems to
neglect the coherence of the sciences (see, for example, Kitcher 1982).
Thus, the following will be restricted to approaches which intend to
take science seriously. One option, not in all respects unlike the funda-
mentalist antagonism, is the dismissal of religion as being in direct
conflict with science, or, at best, as having become totally superfluous.
This line has been presented in an elegant, polemical way by P. W.
Atkins (1981). However, before dismissing religion altogether, we may
consider whether there are any other options available.
Playing down the naturalist account seems to be one possible strategy.
Perhaps the case for science was overstated. If science consists of many
theories which are successful in some restricted domain without justi-
fied pretensions regarding a greater unity, the assumed ontological
monism might be discarded fairly easily. This option seems to charac-
terize the essays of Hesse and Feyerabend in this volume.
If such a line is followed, science is still relevant to religion in two
ways. (1) In those domains where science has successful theories, one
should take good care to avoid contradicting them. Science may per-
haps be unable to provide an encompassing theory, but there are many
discoveries about the way the world is, or even more important, about
the way the world is not. Clinging to refuted ideas, like a flat Earth,
would inhibit the plausibility of the religious convictions espoused. (2)
Science and religion are relevant to each other by contributing to a
clearer view of the proper scope and limits of each enterprise. Thus,
conflicts will be avoided by distinguishing more carefully between the
businesses of science and of religion (e.g. Brummer 1991, pp. lOff.).
One might also opt for a niche within the naturalist account. It would
be too easy, in my opinion, to claim divine intervention in order to
explain phenomena, such as the origin of life, the extinction of the
dinosaurs or the realm of quantum uncertainty. Such a God-of-the-gaps
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is in danger of having to retreat when science advances. Specific human
feelings may seem to be outside the scope of the naturalist approach.
However, confidence in the possibilities of regular explanations of such
phenomena is well expressed by 't Hooft. The size and age of the
Universe are to be expressed in such enormous numbers (counted in
Planck times and Planck lengths) that this allows for 'feeling', 'free
will', 'life' and something like awe and reverence for the immensity of
the Universe ('t Hooft 1992, p. 231).
One might challenge the adequacy of naturalist approaches to
religion. However, one might also accept those explanations, but add
that such explanations do not bear on the possibility of a genuine
religious response, as one could always exclaim 'Was that God's way
of guiding me into faith?'5 Such an overlay on top of the naturalist
explanation is superfluous, and thus in danger of being shaved away
by Occam's razor, even though there is no inconsistency. Once my
children learn that gifts come from parents and grandparents, they
might add that that is Santa Glaus' way of providing for the gifts.
However, they will soon start to look differently upon the whole hap-
pening, though it might remain a nice family event. The experience
changes as a consequence of the newly acquired understanding.
There may be a relevant distinction between the description 'from
outside', and one from within a specific perspective. The experience
from within may be significant, even though another description 'from
outside' is available. Without much hesitation we accept that the Earth
rotates, while we experience the Sun setting. The experience is still
there, but now tied to our specific perspective. Even if the 'thou' meta-
phor which we use in speaking to God would be 'metaphoric, some-
thing is lost when we attempt to translate the religious reality to the
language of 'it', much as the joy of sex is not always enhanced by
understanding the neurobiology of orgasm' (Eaves 1991, p. 502).
Though some pioneering work has been done (e.g. Burhoe 1981,
Theissen 1984), we still need a clearer view of the importance of
religious life if one accepts functional views of religion and morality.
One might also attempt to find a niche apart from the naturalist
account. The proper role of science in relation to religion could be in
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ethical considerations. Medical ethics is a growth business; the physi-
cists, chemists and biologists have their issues. Among these are
nuclear weapons, environmental pollution and genetic engineering, all
of which have attracted public attention. Besides, one might reflect on
the economical ethics involved : what moral considerations are involved
in spending so much money on science? Which science would be
justified? Science needs cultural support which values the search for
knowledge, even if it is not profitable in a direct sense.
It may be questioned whether such ethical issues are within the prov-
ince of religion. It is not only science which has emancipated itself from
religion in modern times, but ethics and politics too. In Western, liberal
societies various religious traditions co-exist under a large umbrella of
allegiance to public laws and procedures and to a general set of human
rights and human values. Religion has lost its grip on the public realm,
but also on the private realm, where increasing numbers of people
tend to base their choices on their own preferences or decisions rather
than on allegiance to some religiously prescribed set of behavioural
codes. The contribution of religion should, perhaps, be located at a
deeper level, in the underlying existential attitude. For example, in dis-
cussing medical ethics one comes across views regarding human fini-
tude and death. Are we willing to accept finitude? And how do 'life'
and 'quality of life' count? Thus, from ethics one enters into a domain
of existential questions.
It is not clear whether ethics is itself a safe niche for religion, as
ethics too has been approached in a naturalist way, for example by
Richard Alexander in The Biology of Moral Systems (Alexander 1987).
However, even if all actual ethical systems are to be seen as strategies
within specific cultures, they nonetheless may be taken to suggest
absolute values as a kind of transcendental regulative idea beyond
all cultural differences. Such absolute values are not available. This
feature should keep us from fanaticism (Sutherland 1984). Whether we
can say that these absolute values exist is strongly dependent upon the
notion of 'existence'. It will not be like the existence of tables and
chairs, nor that of electrons and magnetic monopoles. An analogy with
mathematics might be more fruitful. Mathematics exists as far as it
has been developed by humans, written down in textbooks and articles.
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However, it does not seem as arbitrary as most human artefacts, such
as literature. Mathematical theorems seem to have a truth which pre-
cedes their discovery.
The last option to be considered is a niche above the naturalist account.
As the contribution by Paul Davies in this volume shows, one might
ask various questions about the scientific descriptions as a whole. As
Ernan McMullin wrote (1988, p. 74): 'The appeal is not to a "gap" in
scientific explanation but to a different order of explanation that leaves
scientific explanation intact, that explores the possibility for there being
any kind of explanation'. This does not offer an argument for the
existence of God within the context of science, as it is that context itself
which is the focus of philosophical reflection. Introducing the notion
'God' in this context is not really an answer, an explanation for the
Universe or for God. It points to an open place and keeps us aware of
the questions.
McMullin and Davies agree in reflecting upon the whole of the scien-
tific enterprise rather than upon apparent gaps within a scientific
account. If a sense of wonder, reverence or the like is sufficient to
qualify someone as religious, then both are religious. However, the
normative and ritual aspects of religion are missing from the approach
of Davies. McMullin maintains a richer notion of religion by taking
seriously the religious tradition as it arose in Israel. As he formulates
it, 'God is not to be seen in the universe, then, but through it' (McMullin
1988, p. 59). Mary Hesse, in this volume, al igns more with McMullin
when she emphasizes actual human practices and traditions. She does
not offer an argument for God for those taking a standpoint outside a
specific tradition. Rather than looking for scientific contributions to a
metaphysical theology of nature in the traditional sense, she holds it
to be more fruitful to regard these reflections on science as 'debates
about an appropriate language for theology, and a source of appropri-
ate models' (Hesse 1981, p. 287).
Hesse and Davies address different questions, but neither of them
addresses the agenda of the other in his or her own terms. This con-
firms the claim in the first paragraph of this contribution: discussions
in science and religion are not merely discussions about answers, but
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also disagreements about the problems, and hence about the questions.
The difference between Davies and Hesse also points to a problem
with the various niches described above. One might take seriously the
idea of some cosmic God beyond the naturalistic account, along the
lines suggested by Davies, but would one ever light a candle to such a
God? And if one takes the phenomenon of religion seriously as an
important human practice, as does Hesse, one is in danger of ending
with a religion without referent, a religion without God. How is one
ever to combine such different strands and the transcendental regulat-
ive idea of absolute value?
Notes
1. U.S. News and World Report, 23 December 1991, p. 59.
2. For Galileo's use of Scripture, see McMullin (1981); for a more
socio-political emphasis, see de Santillana (1955); Copernicanism and
exegesis are central to Langford (1966), e.g. pp. 65 ff.
3. Translated in S. Drake, Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (New York:
Doubleday, 1957); quotations have been taken from pp. 197 (twice), 186
and 187.
4. For instance. Surin (1986) rejects a theoretical theodicy. One should ask
what we as God's creatures do to overcome evil and suffering rather than
ask whether existence of an omnipotent and loving God and the amount of
evil and suffering are compatible.
5. As the Dutch philosopher of religion Vincent Brummer argued during the
conference on which this book is based.
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